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Globalization has changed the way countries interact along 
several dimensions. Financial integration and its underpinnings are 
probably among the most important. Although cross-border capital 
flows and external debt have been closely monitored, until recently 
little was known about the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities 
accumulated by various countries, especially in the developing 
world. In this respect, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2006) made 
an important contribution by assembling a comprehensive data set 
for 145 countries over the period 1970–2004.1 According to these 
1. Previous contributions include Sinn (1990) and Rider (1994). Rider builds a 
data set for the period 1970–87, which misses the effect of the significant increase 
of cross-border capital flows in the last decade. Official data are also scarce. Data on 
international investment positions have been published by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in recent years for most industrial countries, but only for a few developing 
countries. For the latter group, IMF stock data are generally available only for gross 
external debt and foreign exchange reserves.
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authors, despite several external crises, financial integration has 
intensified in recent decades among both industrial and developing 
countries. This has been accompanied by significant changes in the 
composition of countries’ international investment position. For 
instance, protracted current account deficits have led a number 
of countries to reduce their net foreign assets considerably. In 
other cases, including Chile, financial integration has resulted in 
substantial and simultaneous expansions of gross international 
liabilities and assets. 
Another interesting stylized fact that emerges from this data set 
is the existence of some persistent differences between the change 
in the net foreign asset position and the current account balance, 
which highlights the importance of valuation effects—capital 
gains and losses—as a source of external wealth. This scenario has 
motivated an increasing number of studies on the consequences 
and relevance of the two basic components of changes in the net 
foreign position, namely, cumulative flows and valuation effects 
of both assets and liabilities. Valuation effects can be substantial. 
For instance, the United States saw its ratio of net foreign asset 
to gross domestic product (GDP) improve by 3 percentage points 
of GDP between 2003 and 2005, despite having a rather large and 
persistent current account deficit (roughly 6 percent of GDP each 
year) that cumulatively should have deteriorated its external position 
by around 12 percentage points of GDP. The difference is due to 
valuation effects under the traditional accounting rules. Hausmann 
and Sturzenegger (2005) propose a different set of accounting rules 
based on the income generated by the financial position for which 
the external position of the United States appears fairly stable over 
the last twenty years.2
Finally, international assets and liabilities can take very different 
forms. Changes in debt contracts, portfolio flows (including bonds and 
equity), foreign direct investment (FDI), and international reserves 
(foreign liquid assets) all explain changes in net foreign assets, but 
they are quite different in nature. 
The objective of this paper is to empirically evaluate the role of net 
foreign assets and their different components in specific key outcomes, 
namely, the probability of an external crisis, the perceived country 
creditworthiness, and the real exchange rate. For that purpose, 
we systematically assess the effects of net foreign assets and their 
2. There is ongoing debate on the Hausmann-Sturzenegger approach, which is 
beyond the scope of this work.239 Stocks, Flows, and Valuation Effects of Foreign Assets and Liabilities
alternative decompositions on external crises, such as current account 
reversals, sudden stops, and currency crises, on countries’ sovereign 
credit ratings (by both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s), and on the 
long-term equilibrium real exchange rate. 
We extend previous contributions and consider detailed information 
on countries’ international investment positions from Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti’s new data set. The previous work on external crises 
limits the analysis of foreign assets and liabilities to international 
reserves, the stock and composition of external debt, and the size 
and composition of capital flows.3 To our knowledge, the same is true 
for empirical research on the determinants of credit ratings and the 
real exchange rate, perhaps reflecting the dearth of available data. 
Although research on real exchange rates consistently assesses the 
role of net foreign assets, it makes no distinction between the different 
components. Such an analysis would have immense practical value, 
since these medium-term trends in exchange rates are an essential 
tool in assessing current and future macroeconomic conditions in 
industrial and developing countries.
The methodology we follow is straightforward: we augment 
empirical models used and validated by other authors to study 
determinants of particular outcomes and assess the contribution 
of the different stocks that make up net foreign assets, as well as 
the implicit flows that explain their variation. We analyze a large 
panel of countries, and we merge the data set compiled by Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti with a few others commonly used to study the 
outcomes we focus on. 
To supplement this analysis, we also examine the role of net foreign 
assets’ valuation effects in determining the probability of external 
crises. This could be the case, for instance, if valuation effects are 
important for the external adjustment process (Gourinchas and Rey, 
2006; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005) or, more generally, if there 
is cross-sectional variation in the denomination of international 
liabilities.4 We empirically assess this issue by evaluating the impact 
of net valuation adjustments on each of three alternative definitions 
of external crisis. 
3. Among the variables that have been considered are foreign direct investments 
versus portfolio flows, long-term versus short-term external debt, fixed-rate versus 
floating-rate borrowing, the ratio of short-term external debt to international 
reserves, the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP, and the ratio of debt services 
to exports.
4. With some countries having only foreign-currency-denominated liabilities, a 
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Our paper tackles a number of important questions from a policy 
perspective. First, it assesses whether the size of net foreign assets 
(a stock beyond current flows) is an important determinant of crisis 
and creditworthiness. Second, it evaluates whether gross external 
assets and liabilities have differentiated roles in determining the 
likelihood of a crisis, the real exchange rate, and creditworthiness. 
Since global financial integration entails high levels of external assets 
and liabilities, a differentiated analysis sheds light on the effects of 
integration and the underlying mechanism. Third, it estimates the 
effects of different components of net external assets on different 
outcomes. For instance, we examine whether FDI is safer—or at 
least perceived as safer—than, say, portfolio investment, or whether 
it has a different effect on the exchange rate than other components 
of net foreign assets. If alternative components of net foreign assets 
have dissimilar effects on the outcomes we analyze, there could be an 
argument in favor of facilitating some types of flows or of hoarding 
international reserves as a counterpart. Finally, it evaluates whether 
valuation effects are different from the impact of accumulated flows 
along different dimensions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 analyzes the role of net 
foreign assets and its components in the likelihood of current account 
reversals, sudden stops, and currency crises, based on a large panel 
of countries. Section 2 analyzes the determinants of country credit 
ratings using ordered probit models including the stock of net foreign 
assets. Section 3 presents cointegrating models of real exchange rate 
determination for a large sample of countries, also considering splits 
of the stock of net foreign assets. Section 4 concludes.
1. FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND EXTERNAL CRISES 
Empirical researchers on external crises (namely, current account 
reversals, sudden stops, and currency crises) have limited their 
analysis of foreign assets and liabilities to the stock of international 
reserves, the stock and composition of external debt, and the size and 
composition of capital flows. Several papers analyze the effect of these 
variables on the probability of occurrence of these crises. Frankel and 
Rose (1996) find that low ratios of FDI flows to external debt increase 
the probability of currency crashes. Both Radelet and Sachs (1998) 
and Rodrik and Velasco (1999) find that the ratio of external debt to 
international reserves is a robust predictor of capital flow reversals, 
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financial crises. Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) examine current 
account reversal episodes and find that the ratio of external debt to 
GDP helps predict these events, while the ratio of FDI flows to GDP 
and the share of short-term debt to total external debt have an effect 
that is not statistically significant. Edwards (2005a, 2005b) finds that 
countries with high current account deficits are more likely to suffer 
a reversal, while the ratio of international reserves to GDP and the 
ratio of external debt to GDP have no statistically significant effect. 
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) highlight the relevance of balance 
sheet effects in explaining the probability of a sudden stop of capital 
inflows; they find that a combination of high current account leverage 
(that is, the ratio of the current account deficit to the absorption of 
tradable goods) and high domestic liability dollarization increases the 
likelihood of a sudden stop.
In this section, we consider standard empirical models used in 
the external crisis literature, augmenting them with partitions of 
net foreign asset stocks and flows. We analyze three types of crisis 
indicators: current account reversals, sudden stops, and exchange rate 
market pressure indexes. Estimations consider maximum-likelihood 
panel probit models and yearly observations for the period 1975–2004. 
The whole sample includes more than a hundred countries.5 Not 
every country has data for every year, so our panel estimations are 
unbalanced. For details on data construction, sources, and the sample 
of economies included, see the appendix.
1.1. Current Account Reversals 
Our basic specification for the probability of current account 
reversal closely follows Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Edwards 
(2005a, 2005b). We consider current account reversal episodes as 
periods in which the current account deficit records a reduction of at 
least 4 percent of GDP over one year and an accumulated reduction 
of at least 5 percent of GDP in three years. Therefore, our dependent 
variable (CARi,t) takes a value of one if country i experiences a current 
account reversal in year t, and zero otherwise. 
The initial set of explanatory variables includes the following: a 
measure of regional contagion represented by the relative occurrence 
of sudden stops in the country’s region (SSR); the ratio of imports to 
GDP as a measure of openness (OPEN); and the percentage change in 
5. The appendix provides a list of economies included in each group.242 Alfredo Pistelli, Jorge Selaive, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
the terms of trade (TOT).6 We consider this set of variables as controls 
and evaluate the effect of the components of alternative partitions of 
net foreign assets. Because one of the key flow variables for explaining 
a current account reversal—identified in Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 
(1998) and Edwards (2005a)—is the first lag of the current account 
deficit, our estimates include two-year lags of stock variables (STOCK) 
and one-year lags of the change in stocks (%STOCK); this also helps 
us identify the effects of flows versus stocks more easily.7 We consider 
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To evaluate alternative partitions of the net foreign asset position, 
we estimate five different specifications. The first one includes 
the one-year lag of overall NFA position, while the remaining four 
specifications breakdown this variable into its stock component 
(two-year lags of NFA position components) and its recent variation 
(one-year lags of current account deficit and valuation adjustments). 
We consider four alternative partitions of the NFA position: (i) the 
overall net foreign asset position; (ii) total gross assets and total 
gross liabilities; (iii) gross FDI assets, gross portfolio equity assets, 
gross portfolio debt assets, gross FDI liabilities, gross portfolio equity 
liabilities, gross portfolio debt liabilities, and international reserves; 
and (iv) cumulative current account balance and cumulative valuation 
adjustments. 
Table 1 presents the results. Because probit coefficients are not 
easy to interpret, we report the marginal effects of one-unit changes in 
regressors on the probability of CAR (expressed in percentage points), 
evaluated at the mean of the data. The estimated coefficients for our 
initial set of explanatory variables are in line with findings by Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Edwards (2005a, 2005b). As expected, 
the lagged current account deficit is a very important determinant 
of the likelihood of a current account reversal. The evidence also 
6. We considered a number of other covariates that did not turn out to be 
statistically relevant. These included per capita GDP, the fiscal deficit, domestic credit 
growth, the U.S. interest rate, and OECD output growth.
7. Change in stocks is divided into transaction flows (current account deficit) and 
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confirms the importance of regional contagion. In this respect, a 
higher incidence of sudden stops in a country’s region increases the 
probability of reversal. An increase in the terms of trade also increases 
the probability of a reversal with a small marginal effect. The effect 
of openness (imports to GDP) on the probability of a reversal seems 
positive, but it is not robust to different specifications.
Column 1 shows that a higher stock of net foreign assets (first 
lag) decreases the probability of a current account reversal. This 
result changes completely, however, if we consider net foreign assets 
(second lag) and the current account deficit simultaneously (column 
2): having larger net foreign assets seems not to affect the likelihood 
of a current account reversal once we control for the current account 
deficit. The result in column 1 thus appears to be driven by the lagged 
current account deficit implicit in net foreign assets. Recall that, by 
definition, NFAt = NFAt–1 + CAt + VAt, where NFA is net foreign asset 
stocks at the end of the year and CA and VA are the current account 
balance and valuation adjustments, respectively. The basic conclusion 
is that transaction flows, represented by the current account deficit, 
are the most significant determinant of current account reversals. Its 
marginal effect on the probability of reversals is much higher than 
the other explanatory variables. 
Despite the significant role of the current account deficit, other 
components of net foreign assets show up as quite relevant. In 
particular, the composition of gross assets and gross liabilities seems 
important (columns 3 and 4). A higher stock of portfolio equity 
assets and a lower stock of portfolio equity liabilities are statistically 
significant in reducing the probability of a reversal. Ceteris paribus, 
countries that accumulate more portfolio equity investment from 
abroad face a higher probability of current account reversal. 
Quantitatively, the effect of an increase in the current account deficit 
by 1 percent of GDP on the probability of a current account reversal 
is more than three times the effect of a 1 percent of GDP increase on 
the stock of portfolio equity liabilities. 
The analysis by gross components also shows that the stock of 
FDI liabilities reduces the probability of a current account reversal. 
Having accumulated FDI flows decreases the likelihood of a current 
account reversal. 
We also find a statistically important role for valuation effects. 
When we disaggregate the stock of net foreign assets into cumulative 
financial transactions (cumulative current account balance) and 
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probability of reversal (column 5). Unexpectedly, the lagged valuation 
adjustment (a flow) appears to be very significant, with a positive 
sign. However, the puzzling marginal effect of this flow component is 
around one-sixth the effect of the current account deficit. 
1.2 Sudden Stops of Capital Inflows
The recent literature on external crises focuses not only on current 
account reversals as a measure of crisis, but also on sudden stops of capital 
inflows.8 A sudden stop episode occurs when the flow of capital coming 
to a country is reduced significantly in a very short period of time. 
Current account reversals and sudden stop episodes do not 
necessarily coincide. Although the two phenomena are strongly 
related, a country could certainly suffer a sharp reduction in capital 
inflows without experiencing a current account reversal. By definition, 
net capital inflows are equal to the sum of the current account deficit 
and the net change in international reserves. The latter component 
may absorb part of the effect of a reduction of capital inflows on the 
current account balance. In fact, empirical evidence confirms that 
sudden stops may imply a quite different timing for the onset of a 
crisis compared to current account reversals: in our data set, only 
28 percent (31 percent) of current account reversals (sudden stops) 
coincide with sudden stops (current account reversals). 
This section evaluates the effect of the stock of net foreign assets, 
and its composition, on the likelihood of sudden stops of capital inflows. 
As in the previous sections, we estimate a panel probit model using 
a broad multi-country data set and evaluate the effect of alternative 
partitions of country’s net foreign asset position on the likelihood of 
a sudden stop. Following Edwards (2005b), we define a sudden stop 
as a reduction in net capital inflows of at least 5 percent of GDP in 
one year. The country in question must have received an inflow of 
capital larger to its region’s third quartile during the two years prior 
to the sudden stop. Since current account reversals and sudden stops 
are closely related phenomena, our estimations consider the same 
explanatory variables used in previous section. 
Table 2 reports the results. In line with the findings of Calvo, 
Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004), openness increases the probability of a 
sudden stop. Evidence confirms the importance of regional contagion: 
8. For more on sudden stops, see Calvo (1998) Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003), 
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having a sudden stop in the country’s region increases the probability 
of a sudden stop. This finding supports Calvo’s (1999) view that 
liquidity shocks to investors stemming from adverse developments 
in one country may trigger the sale of assets from other countries in 
the investors’ portfolio to restore liquidity.
With regard to foreign assets and liabilities, we find that a higher 
stock of net foreign assets reduces the likelihood of a sudden stop 
(column 1). Also, when we break down net foreign assets into one-year-
lagged net foreign assets, lagged current account deficit, and valuation 
adjustment, we observe that net foreign assets is not significant 
while the current account deficit emerges as the main determinant of 
sudden stops (column 2). A higher current account deficit increases the 
likelihood of sudden stops. Also, its marginal effect on the probability 
of a crisis is the highest of all the explanatory variables.
Although the net foreign asset position is not significant when 
we include current account deficit, its composition seems to matter 
(columns 3 and 4). Both FDI assets and liabilities have an impact: 
countries that accumulate more direct investment abroad (FDI assets) 
are more prone to sudden stops; while countries that accumulate more 
foreign direct investment (FDI liabilities) face a smaller chance of 
crisis. Unexpectedly, a higher stock of international reserves is related 
to a higher probability of sudden stop. This last result may be due to 
endogeneity: countries that are more prone to crises are required to 
hoard larger stocks of international reserves. Finally, both valuation 
adjustments and cumulative valuation adjustments are statistically 
insignificant (column 5).
How different are these result from our findings for current account 
reversals? The current account deficit is the main determinant of 
both types of crisis. Not only is the marginal effect on the probability 
of a crisis the highest of the explanatory variables, but it is also very 
significant. Portfolio equity assets and liabilities are key for current 
account reversals, with higher marginal effects, while the stocks of 
FDI assets and portfolio equity assets seem more relevant for sudden 
stops. Finally, the valuation component of net foreign assets matters 
only for current account reversals. 
1.3. Exchange Rate Market Pressure
Our third measure of external crisis is an indicator of exchange 
rate market pressure. We again consider a large sample of country 
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and liabilities in the likelihood of episodes of significant pressure 
on the exchange rate market. As in the previous section, we do not 
attempt to test specific theories on this matter, but rather examine 
the contribution of foreign assets and liabilities. The valuation effects 
that emerge from these holdings, usually denominated in different 
currencies, lead to large capital gains or losses. The basic question is 
whether foreign assets or liabilities (or both) are relevant in explaining 
a country’s vulnerability to an exchange rate crash. 
The exchange rate market pressure (ERMP) measure considered 
here is the standard index defined by Eichengreen and others (1995), 
which includes both large exchange rate depreciations and speculative 
attacks that are successfully warded off by the authorities. The 
latter include episodes characterized by large and sudden falls in 
international reserves (or increases in interest rates). Concretely, a 
speculative attack exists when the ERMP index is above a certain 
threshold. The index is a weighted average of changes in the real 
exchange rate (RER) and in international reserves (IRES) for country 
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The weights XRER and XIRES are the relative precision of each 
variable, defined as the inverse of the variance for each variable for 
all countries and over the full sample period. We do not consider 
interest rates in constructing the index because of the lack of 
comparable data. 
The rationale for using this measure to characterize a currency 
crisis is that it captures the options faced by a government. At a given 
moment, authorities may tolerate currency depreciation or avoid it 
through intervention (or by raising the interest rate). We consider 
that a currency crisis (CR) episode occurs when this index exceeds 
its mean by more than three standard deviations. The mean and the 
standard deviation are country specific:
CR
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We assume that there is a well-defined function that relates 
macroeconomic variables to the probability of a crisis in country 
i in period t. The estimation procedure closely follows previous 
contributions, including Eichengreen and others (1995), Milessi-
Ferretti and Razin (1998), Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002), and 
García and Soto (2005). We estimate a probit model using maximum 
likelihood and considering several explanatory variables other than 
foreign assets and liabilities. All these variables are lagged one year, 
and their inclusion follows the large literature on currency crises. 
As before, we report marginal effects, that is, the effects of one-unit 
changes in regressors on the probability of a crash (expressed in 
percentage points), evaluated at the mean of the data. Although 
the estimates cannot be interpreted structurally, they allow us to 
characterize currency crises.
Numerous theoretical models have been used to explain the causes 
and origins of currency crises.9 First-generation models (Krugman, 
1979; Blanco and Garber, 1986) emphasize the role of inconsistencies 
between fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. Key variables 
that emerge from this approach are the exchange rate regime, 
domestic credit growth, the level of international reserves, and the 
fiscal balance. Second-generation models, such as Obstfeld (1996), 
consider that governments face tradeoffs (output-inflation), so their 
decisions are not state invariant. From the government’s standpoint, 
it may be optimal to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime even if it 
might have been possible (at some cost) to maintain it. A key variable 
that emerges is the overvaluation of the real exchange rate. Ceteris 
paribus, the more overvalued the real exchange rate, the bigger the 
incentives for the government to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime 
and, therefore, the higher the probability of having a currency crisis 
in the coming months. 
Third-generation models focus on moral hazard and imperfect 
information, highlighting the importance of banking problems and 
overborrowing as determinants of a currency crisis. Diaz-Alejandro 
(1985) and Velasco (1987) model banking problems as determinants of 
currency crises, whereby the central bank’s financing of the rescue of 
the financial system could be inconsistent with a managed exchange 
rate regime. These models suggest that the growth in bank credit may 
play an important part in currency crises. 
9. For a review of the economic literature on currency crises, see Eichengreen and 
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More recent models highlight the relevance of capital flows as 
a possible source of instability (Calvo, 1998; Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Talvi, 2003). A sudden stop of capital inflows can generate a liquidity 
crisis and trigger a significant depreciation of the domestic currency. 
Variables such as foreign interest rates, the amount of external debt, 
and the composition of foreign assets and liabilities might have an 
important impact.
Our set of control variables is rather standard and follows previous 
empirical contributions on the determinants of speculative attacks and 
currency crises. We follow Frankel and Rose (1996) and Milesi-Ferretti 
and Razin (1998) in examining seven variables related to domestic 
macroeconomic conditions and currency crises: the growth rate of 
bank credit; the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP; the current account 
deficit as a percentage of GDP; the real growth rate of GDP; the real 
growth rate of exports; the degree of overvaluation of the real exchange 
rate; and the stock of international reserves. We also include foreign 
variables such as the U.S. interest rate and the real GDP growth rate 
in member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD); a dummy variable for a fixed exchange rate 
regime; and a measure of trade openness represented by the ratio of 
imports to GDP. Our measure of real exchange rate overvaluation is 
the deviation of the actual value of the real exchange rate from the 
trend component of a rolling Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
The growth in bank credit is intended to capture the monetary policy 
stance and overborrowing. Crashes are more likely to occur in countries 
where the real exchange rate is appreciated relative to its historical 
average. We take a step forward on this variable and introduce the real 
exchange rate misalignment estimated from a rolling (real time) HP 
filter. As suggested by second-generation models, sluggish GDP growth 
may trigger difficulties in repaying the debt burden, and the government 
may be reluctant to implement stabilization programs if output is already 
slowing down (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2002). Trade openness exposes the 
country to external shocks, but it may benefit the economy through gained 
opportunities to share risk with the rest of the world. Export growth can 
serve as a driving force for economic growth or as a proxy for misalignment. 
Finally, the U.S. interest rate is a measure of how “easy” foreign borrowing 
is. The literature includes other variables to explain currency crashes, 
but there is no clear consensus on their importance and significance. We 
therefore chose to avoid overparameterizing our benchmark model and 
took the most parsimonious specification, which we extend with stocks, 
cumulative flows, and valuation effects of foreign assets and liabilities, 
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After we remove insignificant variables, our basic model is reduced 
to five variables: the degree of overvaluation or misalignment of the 
real exchange rate; the growth rate of bank credit; the growth rate of 
real GDP; the growth rate of exports; and the U.S. interest rate. This 
model is extended with alternative disaggregations of the net foreign 
asset position.
Table 3 reports the results. Real exchange rate misalignment 
measured by the rolling HP filter of the effective real exchange rate 
has the expected sign, but it is not always statistically significant.10 
Bank credit is significant for all specifications, suggesting a significant 
role for financial variables in line with third-generation models of 
currency crises. While GDP growth is not significant, we report a 
negative and significant association between crashes and export 
growth. Finally, an increase in the U.S. interest rate increases the 
probability of a crisis.
The net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP) is negatively 
related to currency crises (column 1). The previous period’s current 
account deficit—the main component of the change in net foreign 
assets —appears to have no link to a currency crisis (column 2). This 
contrasts sharply with the results on current account reversals. Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (1998) also report a statistically insignificant link 
between these variables when they include a large sample of middle- 
and low-income economies.
Disaggregating net foreign assets into total gross assets and 
gross liabilities (columns 3 and 4) shows that gross assets play a 
significant role. Within gross assets, debt is the only statistically 
significant component. Interestingly, if we split net foreign assets 
between cumulative current account and cumulative valuation 
adjustments (column 5), both turn out to significantly reduce 
the probability of a currency crash. The marginal contribution 
of cumulative valuation effects almost dobles the contribution of 
cumulative current account. 
Table 4 presents a summary of the main results, distinguishing 
among the different components of the stock of net foreign assets and 
the types of external crises. Our results support the view that assets 
and liabilities are rather different external holdings. A larger stock of 
10. We also performed estimations including the cyclical component of the HP filter 
and using the whole sample. Although the coefficient turned out to be highly significant 
under this procedure, we prefer a real-time variable to avoid overfitting currency attacks. 
An ex post filter is equivalent to using information that will only be available in the 
future to determine whether domestic currency is presently undervalued. Although 
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net foreign assets does not necessarily make crises less likely: both the 
composition of the overall position of international investments and 
the amount of financial flows (namely, the current account deficit) are 
key determinants. Changes in the composition of gross assets towards 
more portfolio investment and less FDI assets make current account 
reversals and sudden stops less likely. The opposite happens with the 
composition of gross liabilities.
Also, the cumulative valuation adjustment component of net 
foreign assets reduces the probability of a crisis, while the cumulative 
financial flow (cumulative current account balance) is often irrelevant. 
In general, financial flows (that is, current account deficits) do not 
matter for currency crises and are very important for current account 
reversals and sudden stops.
Table 4. Foreign Assets and Liabilities and External Crises:  
Main Results








Net foreign assets (NFA) n.s. n.s. (–)
Gross assets
FDI assets n.s. (+) n.s.
Portfolio equity assets (–) (–) n.s.
Portfolio debt assets n.s. n.s. (–)
International reserves n.s. (+) n.s.
Gross Liabilities
FDI liabilities (–) (–) n.s.
Portfolio equity liabilities (+) n.s. n.s.








Current account deficit (+) (+) n.s.
Valuation adjustment (+) n.s. n.s.
No. crises 53 49 53
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Only the sign of statistically significant coefficients are reported (n.s.: not significant).257 Stocks, Flows, and Valuation Effects of Foreign Assets and Liabilities
2. FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND SOVEREIGN 
CREDIT RATINGS
In this section, we identify whether the size and composition of 
foreign assets and liabilities help explain the sovereign risk ratings 
awarded by the rating agencies to developing economies. Our approach 
consists of modeling sovereign ratings within a maximum-likelihood, 
ordered probit framework. The credit standing of an obligor, at the end 
of the period, is assumed to be governed by a latent variable consisting 
of a random error plus an index of macroeconomic variables.11 
Indices such as the EMBI, assembled on the basis of price 
movements in emerging-economy secondary bond markets, are 
related to the borrowing costs of sovereign or private bond issuers. 
The correlation and possible causality between qualitative ratings of 
sovereign risk, on the one hand, and indices of the premiums charged 
in the secondary sovereign bond markets, on the other, are important 
factors that have a bearing on the interest rates in emerging economies. 
This is a direct channel of influence exercised by risk ratings on the 
macroeconomic management of emerging economies.
The principal international official and private credit risk rating 
agencies (namely, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s) regularly carry 
out sovereign risk rating exercises. The rating agencies dealing 
with sovereign risk seek to assess the capacity and willingness of a 
sovereign government to service its debt within the maturity dates 
and in accordance with the conditions agreed upon with the creditors 
at the time the loans were contracted. The outcome of this assessment 
is synthesized in ratings, which essentially are estimates of the 
probability that a given government will default—meaning not only 
the suspension of interest payments or nonpayment of the principal 
at maturity date, but also its swap or “involuntary” restructuring. 
Risk ratings are straightforward indicators available in the public 
domain, and their fairly widespread use to manage risk exposure is a 
sign that investors consider them to be appropriate indicators of the 
probability of default. Ratings are indicators of relative risk across 
countries. A given country with an Aa rating will not necessarily 
remain creditworthy, but that tends to be the case more frequently 
over time than for economies with lower risk ratings. Default rates 
are sensitive to economic factors at the time they are calculated, 
11. In this section, we follow Godoy (2006) in defining the benchmark dependent 
variables and in the sample of economies, which are listed in the appendix.258 Alfredo Pistelli, Jorge Selaive, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
and they vary considerably in line with world and local economic 
cycles. Our exercise tries to disentangle the role of asset and liability 
holdings, controlling for variables usually reported as explanatory of 
credit ratings.12 
Variables commonly used in past studies of credit ratings may be 
classified as liquidity variables, solvency variables, macroeconomic 
fundamentals, and external variables. Liquidity variables include 
the debt-service-to-exports ratio, the interest-to-service ratio, and the 
liquidity-gap ratio, which all capture short-run financing problems. 
Most empirical results point to the debt-service-to-exports indicator 
as the most significant (Hu, Kiesel, and Perraudin, 2002). Solvency 
variables measure a country’s medium- to long-term ability to service 
its debt; they include the reserves-to-imports and debt-to-GDP 
ratios. The key macroeconomic fundamentals are the inflation rate, 
investment/GDP, and GDP growth; and external variables include 
the U.S. Treasury interest rates and commodity prices. 
We estimate an ordered probit model for the period 1990–2004 
using a sample of fifty-two developing economies. Block and Vaaler 
(2004) and Hu, Kiesel, and Perraudin (2002) use the same estimation 
procedure, based on its better forecasting ability relative to linear 
procedures. We consider sovereign credit ratings of Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s separately.
The assumption of ordered probit estimation, which is relatively 
standard for credit ratings, is that for j + 1 rating categories and the 
initial rating of a particular obligor, i, the terminal rating at the end of 
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Zs are scalar cut-off points. It is assumed that R = CX + Y, where X is a 
vector of predetermined variables and Y is assumed to have a standard 
normal distribution. The probabilities of being in each category are 
thus as follows: Prob(j = 0) = '(–CX), Prob(j = 1) = '(Z1 – CX),…, 
Prob(j = J + 1) = 1 – '(Zj – CX). 
12. See, for example, Cantor and Parker (1996) for cross-section estimation and 
Hu, Kiesel, and Perraudin (2002) for panel estimation. 259 Stocks, Flows, and Valuation Effects of Foreign Assets and Liabilities
Our dataset of credit ratings is collected directly from Bloomberg 
and is ordered such that AAA (Aaa) corresponds to 20 and D 
corresponds to 0 under Standard and Poor’s (Moody’s) classification. 
Table 5 presents the results of the baseline estimation. The benchmark 
variables in the baseline model are the ones we might expect to 
influence credit ratings standing, and they are also included in past 
empirical studies as determinants of sovereign ratings. Overall, 
there is a robust selection of liquidity, solvency, and macroeconomic 
variables, abstracting from external variables which are partially 
captured in the domestic macroeconomic variables.13
As expected and widely reported in previous contributions, we 
observe a significant role for GDP growth in Standard and Poor’s 
ratings. Remarkably, per capita income, the inflation rate, and the 
fiscal deficit are significant for most specifications. The debt-service-
to-exports ratio is not significant in Moody’s ratings, and it has the 
wrong sign in Standard and Poor’s. A larger current account deficit 
is associated with a better rating. This last result may be explained 
by the endogeneity of the series, but it may also reflect the fact 
that developing countries experienced a strong process of financial 
integration in the 1990s—mainly through larger indebtedness with 
the rest of the world. This timeline does not bring enough cross-section 
variability as an explanatory variable, however. Block and Vaaler 
(2004) report a similar result for a sample of seventeen emerging 
market economies.
Including different measures of stocks of foreign assets and 
liabilities yields several interesting results. Our estimates suggest 
that net foreign assets have a significant effect on one of the rating 
agencies only (Standard and Poor’s; see column 7). Furthermore, the 
split between gross assets and gross liabilities shows that while Moody’s 
ratings appear not to depend on any of them, Standard and Poor’s reacts 
to both with effects that are broadly similar (columns 4 and 9). 
With regard to net and gross components of net foreign assets 
(columns 3, 5, 8, and 10), the results show that their effect in the 
aggregate for Standard and Poor’s is explained not only by the role 
of debt, but also by a significant role of FDI liabilities and equity 
liabilities. Allowing nonresidents to hold large shares of domestic 
stocks and firms seems to be positively associated with credit ratings. 
Debt assets, which are associated with lending to the rest of world, 
are positively associated with Moody’s ratings. Similarly, equity 
13. We also performed estimations including the real oil price, and results were 
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assets, which are related to the acquisitions of stocks in external 
financial markets, seem to be quite significant for Standard and 
Poor’s ratings.
Finally, we evaluate the role of changes in gross assets and 
liabilities, distinguishing aggregate components (table 6). We do 
not include the current account, to avoid colinearity with the other 
explanatory variables. As expected, increases in debt liabilities 
are negatively associated with credit ratings. Again, we observe a 
significant effect for FDI liabilities in improving credit ratings.
The above exercises confirm that assets and liabilities have an 
important effect on the credit ratings of emerging market economies. 
They also highlight the importance of distinguishing among the 
different components of countries’ international investment position. 
We find support for the view that FDI liabilities play a part in sovereign 
ratings, in a context in which FDI has usually been associated with 
a large potential for generating employment, raising productivity, 
transferring skills and technology, enhancing exports, and contributing 
to the long-term economic development of the recipient country.
3. FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND THE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATE 
An increasingly dominant view is that over the business cycle, the 
real exchange rate tends to move toward an underlying equilibrium 
value determined by real factors, usually defined by some version 
of purchasing power parity. Examining the path of the equilibrium 
exchange rate over time can be extremely helpful in allowing 
economists to determine the degree to which movements in actual 
exchange rates have deviated from fundamentals and to offer some 
idea as to the likely rate of return to the underlying equilibrium. 
This has immense practical value, as such medium-term trends in 
exchange rates are an essential tool in assessing current and future 
macroeconomic conditions in industrial and developing countries.
This section extends previous contributions that assess the role 
of foreign assets in the long-run dynamics of the real exchange rate. 
In particular, we evaluate whether the alternative components of 
external assets affect the real exchange rate in the same way, based 
on a large panel of countries. An empirical assessment is important 
for policy analysis since it will allow us to judge whether the process of 
international financial integration may affect the level and dynamics 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.264 Alfredo Pistelli, Jorge Selaive, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
As our starting point, we consider the same basic specification 
that has been used elsewhere to evaluate the effect of fundamentals 
on the real exchange rate. In particular, we use the specification 
and country sample outlined in Aguirre and Calderón (2005). They 
construct a series of equilibrium real exchange rate measures for 
a large group of countries to obtain misalignment estimates; they 
then use standard empirical growth equations to evaluate how 
misalignment estimates affect growth. 
The specification follows the so-called single-equation approach, 
which relates the real exchange rate to a particular set of fundamentals 
in a reduced form and has a long tradition in empirical international 
finance. Edwards (1989), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and Faruqee 
(1994) provide theoretical underpinnings that motivate the type of 
fundamentals to be considered. Almost all of the fundamentals have 
an effect on the real exchange rate from a flow perspective. Higher 
productivity will appreciate the domestic currency in real terms 
(appreciate the real exchange rate herein) through the well known 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. More favorable terms of trade allow the 
country to spend more, thereby pressuring nontradable goods prices 
and appreciating the real exchange rate. A larger participation of 
government spending will appreciate the real exchange rate through 
a composition effect (which is usually assumed to be relatively 
nontradables intensive) or just as an aggregate demand effect if there 
is not perfect capital mobility. 
More importantly for the purpose of this paper, the stock of net 
foreign assets (as a ratio to GDP) should influence the real exchange 
rate because owning more assets has a counterpart in larger revenues 
earned (a surplus in factor payments), which in turn can finance a 
larger sustainable commercial deficit in steady state. This larger 
commercial deficit is coherent only with a more appreciated real 
exchange rate. Of all the fundamentals considered, net foreign assets 
is the only one that is a stock. Its impact, however, stems from its flow 
effect on the current account. 
In principle, if all components of net foreign assets have the same 
rate of return, they should have the same effect on the equilibrium 
real exchange rate, for they would produce the same income flow. 
Nevertheless, expected returns may differ across particular assets and 
liabilities. More importantly, the different components of net foreign 
assets can have very different valuation effects, which in turn may 
depend on the exchange rate. The dynamics of the real exchange rate 
could also be influenced by the flows associated with the changing 265 Stocks, Flows, and Valuation Effects of Foreign Assets and Liabilities
stocks. In this case, an increase in a particular asset could end up 
depreciating the exchange rate, at least temporarily. 
Several studies use a specification similar to the one we use here to 
study the effects of different fundamentals on the real exchange rate. 
Goldfajn and Valdés (1999) use a very similar approach to calculate 
misalignments and study the way they are resolved. Valdés and 
Délano (1999) use the same type of model to explore the quantitative 
relevance of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Razin and Collins (1997) 
consider panel fundamental real exchange rate equations to study the 
effects of misalignments on growth. Edwards and Savastano (2000) 
survey other papers that make use of this approach. 
The basic specification we consider includes a real exchange rate 
constructed from the domestic consumer price index (CPI) and the 
wholesale price index (WPI) of trading partners, while productivity is 
measured as the relative tradables-to-nontradables labor productivity. 
Net foreign assets corresponds to the series constructed by Lane and 
Milessi-Ferreti (2001), updated with capital account information. 
The results of the basic specification (column 1 in table 7) are 
the same as in Aguirre and Calderón (2005). The four fundamentals 
have the expected sign and are highly significant: higher productivity, 
improved terms of trade, a larger share of government consumption in 
GDP, and higher net foreign assets (as a percentage of GDP) are all 
correlated with a more appreciated domestic currency in real terms. 
Furthermore, the tests on the stationarity of residuals show that the 
variables cointegrate (table 8).14
When we split the whole sample into industrial and developing 
countries, the results of the former continue to meet expectations.15 In 
the developing countries’ subsample, however, productivity is no longer 
statistically significant, whereas terms-of-trade shocks appear to 
depreciate the real exchange rate. Cointegration continues to hold. 
When we consider alternative decompositions of net foreign 
assets, the results show that gross assets and gross liabilities have 
quite similar effects on the real exchange rate in all three cases (with 
the opposite sign) (column 2). More external assets or less gross 
liabilities equivalent to one percentage point of GDP appreciate the 
real exchange rate by approximately 0.1 percent if one considers the 
full sample and the subsample industrial countries. For developing 
countries, assets appear to appreciate the real exchange rate by 
almost 0.15 percent, while liabilities depreciate it by 0.1 percent. 
14. Rank cointegration test is available on request.
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Although gross assets and liabilities appear roughly equally 
important in determining the real exchange rate, different 
components of net foreign assets have quite different effects (column 3). 
Considering all countries together, we find that while the cumulative 
current account has a positive effect on the real exchange rate (as 
expected in theory), the valuation effect has a negative one, albeit 
smaller in magnitude. Within the subsamples, the current account 
result still holds (with a larger effect in developing countries), but 
the valuation effect has a positive impact in industrial countries 
and a rather large negative effect in developing countries. Part of 
this could be the result of a reverse causality problem: in developing 
countries, real exchange rate depreciation may have a larger adverse 
consequence for valuation effects (that is, a larger share of their 
liabilities is denominated in foreign currency). 
As for different components by type of flows (column 4), FDI does 
not have any significant impact on the real exchange rate for the 
full sample, whereas net portfolio and net debt assets have a strong 
positive effect. International reserve assets appear to depreciate 
the real exchange rate. Some of these results do not hold for both 
subsamples simultaneously. In fact, both net debt and reserve 
accumulation appear to be quite relevant for developing countries’ 
real exchange rate, which is not the case in industrial economies.16 
Net portfolio significantly appreciates the real exchange rate only in 
the subsample of industrial countries. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite several external crises, financial integration has 
intensified in recent decades in industrial and developing countries. 
This has been accompanied by significant changes in the composition 
of countries’ international investment position. Large holdings of 
foreign assets and liabilities, along with increasing relevance of the 
valuation effects, have characterized the international financial 
integration of economies. 
In this paper, we have empirically assessed the implications of 
stocks, flows, and valuation adjustments in current account reversals, 
sudden stops, speculative attacks, and sovereign ratings, as well as 
in the long-run dynamics of real exchange rates in industrial and 
16. The results should be compared with some care, considering that the actual 
samples change depending on data availability.269 Stocks, Flows, and Valuation Effects of Foreign Assets and Liabilities
developing economies. The paper has tackled a number of policy-
oriented questions. First, it assessed whether the size of net foreign 
assets (a stock beyond current flows) is an important determinant 
of crises and creditworthiness. Second, it evaluated whether gross 
external assets and liabilities have differentiated roles in determining 
the likelihood of crises, the real exchange rate, and creditworthiness. 
Third, it estimated the effects of different components of net external 
assets on different outcomes. Finally, it explored the differences and 
similarities between valuation effects and the impact of accumulated 
flows in different dimensions. 
We found support for the view that assets and liabilities are 
rather distinctive external holdings with different implications 
for the occurrence of an external crisis. In general, flows do not 
influence the likelihood of currency attacks and are quite relevant 
for current account reversals and sudden stops. A higher stock of 
net foreign assets reduces the likelihood of currency crises, while its 
composition is what matters for reversals and sudden stops: more 
portfolio equity assets and FDI liabilities reduce the likelihood of 
these crises. Furthermore, cumulative valuation adjustments seem 
to have a statistically significant impact on current account reversals 
and currency crises.
In the long-run dynamics of the real exchange rate, gross assets 
and liabilities appeared to be equally important, but components 
of external holdings have considerably different effects. While the 
cumulative current account is associated with real depreciation of the 
currency in the long run, a valuation effect is strongly linked with real 
currency appreciations in developing economies. 
From an economic policy perspective, our work sheds light on 
the importance of how economies integrates with the rest of world. 
The amount of assets and liabilities the economy accumulates is not 
innocuous. Some assets and liabilities, and the flows associated with 
them, may trigger important valuation effects that, along with the 
external holdings, certainly are significant in the mechanism for 
adjusting to external shocks and in the constraints the economy faces 
in the international financial markets. Further research on this issue 
is unquestionably a must for academia and policymakers. 270 Alfredo Pistelli, Jorge Selaive, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
APPENDIX 
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE DEFINITION
The data for the estimations on current account reversals 
correspond to Edwards (2005b). The data set for the estimations 
on exchange rate market pressure corresponds to García and Soto 
(2005). These data sets were enlarged with the foreign assets and 
liabilities of the main components of the international investment 
position prepared by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).17 Valuation 
adjustments were constructed subtracting from the net foreign asset 
position (assets and liabilities) the cumulative current account taken 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. All stock and flow 
series are over current GDP in dollars. 
For the credit ratings estimations, we take the year-end sovereign 
ratings released by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s for the period 
1990–2005. Ratings were converted into a numeric scale as indicated 
in table A1.
For the panel real exchange rate, we take the real exchange rate, 
productivity, government consumption, and terms of trade from 
Aguirre and Calderón (2005). Foreign assets and liabilities are again 
taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Country and fixed effects 
were removed from the series on foreign assets and liabilities before 
performing the long-run estimations.
We used a sample of 136 countries for our analysis of current 
account reversals, currency crises, and sudden stops. The full sample 
encompasses 33 industrial and 103 developing countries. See table A2 
for the complete list.
The real exchange rate panel regressions include 49 countries. 
The 20 industrial countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 29 
developing countries in the sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, 
Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
17. Available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip.271 Stocks, Flows, and Valuation Effects of Foreign Assets and Liabilities
Table A1. Numeric Conversion of Standard and Poor’s and 
Moody’s Ratings























The credit rating regressions are based on the following 52 
countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji Islands, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, 
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, 
South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, 
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